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Freedom of Association in the Euro-Mediterranean Region: An Overview |
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It may be helpful to stress the fundamental role that associations2 play in the construction of civil society, given that they fulfil the following roles and functions in succession:
- Organised counterweight in the face of state bodies
- Form of democratic participation and instrument for training citizens for civic participation
- Instrument of social and economic development
- Tool for the protection and promotion of collective and public rights
Despite the important role played by associations, but undoubtedly also because of their fundamental position in the democratic construction, freedom of association has been seen with mistrust and even hostility by political regimes. In addition, in many countries of the world, the law of associations is a branch of the legal corpus that has attracted little attention on the part of lawyers and legal experts. Associations of individuals, essentially characterised by the fact that they do not seek to share profits, are, in this context, much less known than the related institution, namely the corporation. It can be seen from the foregoing that while freedom of association is a fundamental freedom, it is a right that is among the least well known in international law3.
Association legislation is used in Mediterranean states as an instrument for controlling civil societies. The true motivations behind this control, seldom spelled out in the eastern Mediterranean, are even more concealed on its southern shore because they are essentially linked to the fear of democratic development and to a form sort of competition in the context of public and social actions that is ill perceived and recognised by many governments. Thus association law is a true reflection of the extent of government control and one of the most relevant indicators of the democratic development of a society or a state.
This overview of association law will review the situation in European countries and in the 11 countries of the eastern and southern Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestinian Territories, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey).
Before assessing the different legislations, we will: describe the scope of freedom of association in the constitutional law of the countries in question, and then identify the sources of the legislation, by placing it in their legal and socio-political context.
Freedom of association is a constitutional principle in most countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region
The constitutions of the majority of countries around the Mediterranean (Israel being an exception) explicitly proclaim freedom of association while using more or less restrictive approaches4[4]. The constitutions of all Arab states subordinate the exercise of freedom of association to the limits provided for in the law. This provision – a legal sinkhole – is used by political regimes to impose specific restrictions on associations, very often in violation of basic freedoms.
The recognition of the constitutional value of a basic freedom presents a practical interest in countries where judicial review of constitutionality exists. A prime example is the French Constitutional Council’s decision of 16 July 1971 on freedom of association, which began by stating that freedom of association was a principle of constitutional value and then declared that legislative provisions submitted to its review did not comply with the Constitution.
Similarly, Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court, in an important decision made on 1st July 2000, referred in an obiter dictum to the constitutional principle of freedom of association in repealing Law No. 153 on association, adopted by the Egyptian Parliament in 1999. The Supreme Constitutional Court, after a lengthy discussion on the importance of associations and the place of freedom of association in international law, characterised the law on association as a text that complemented the Constitution, which made it necessary to submit the legislative proposal to the Council of State before forwarding it to Parliament. This procedure led to the repeal of the law (for defect of form).
In the eastern and southern Mediterranean, sharia, or Muslim law, is the source of association law only in the case of the Waqf, which is similar to the French institution of the ‘fondation’ or the English institution of ‘charitable trust’.
The influence of French law on the drafting of association laws
Throughout the Ottoman Empire, which encompassed most of the Arab countries of today, the Tanzimat, laws adopted at the urging of the global and European great powers in the early 20th century, introduced an adaptation of France’s Law of 1901 into the Ottoman legal system.
Even after new laws were drafted, the influence of the French legal tradition continued – albeit in much watered-down form – in many Arab countries, particularly in the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia). Only Lebanon retained the Ottoman law of 1909 as the general law of associations, with some changes being brought in 1928 and 1932.
The influence of Egyptian law on different Arab laws
Beginning in 1952, Egyptian law became the reference for several Arab countries of the Middle East, including Syria (especially after the Union of 1958), Jordan and the Palestinian Territories. The influence of Egyptian law, a paradigm of extreme violation of freedom of association, was for a long time used to legitimise legal repression against civil societies.
Current trends and socio-political environment of the law of associations in Euro-Mediterranean countries
In order to conduct a valid examination of association law, the discussion must take place in the socio-political context of the different countries of the Euro-Mediterranean region, of which it is virtually a reflection. It would be inappropriate to generalise, and any assessment, from both a legal and a political point of view, can only be equitable if each of the countries concerned is analysed separately. It is useful, however, to recall the negative assessment of the situation in most of these countries that was made in the Amman Declaration. In the preamble, the Declaration noted that, in varying degrees, Arab countries were characterised by ‘the absence of democracy, human rights and fundamental freedoms, the continuity of security as […] reflected in several exceptional laws, the foremost of which are emergency laws. This is compounded by the widening scope of poverty, unemployment and social disintegration accompanied by a rise in the rate of illiteracy’5[5].
To this socio-political picture must be added the weakness of the rule of law and of the institutional democratic counterweights (parliaments and the judiciary), which gives the executive, as well as security considerations, free rein to restrict freedom of association, even in violation of the law.
Against this background, it is almost easy to understand why political regimes fear the development, through associations, of a democratic counterforce that is capable of criticising them or challenging their legitimacy. In addition to these general concerns, two considerations specific to the region must be mentioned:
- The war against terrorism, the fight against Islamic associations and the fear of organised religious fundamentalism are pretexts used, with or without justification, by several states (including European ones) to legitimise, essentially in the eyes of international public opinion, measures of repression or restrictions against associations.
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Human rights organisations, in many Arab countries the only possible alternative to political opposition, are prohibited. These organisations are perceived by Arab regimes as one of the greatest dangers they face. As evidence of this, it is enough to recall that the Conference of Arab Interior Ministers – one of the most active and most effective pan-Arab bodies – considers the human rights movement as a dangerous movement that it is committed to monitor very closely.
However, several countries in the region are experiencing a period of democratic transition: improvements are taking place in both the legislative and the judicial area, and more attention is being paid to civil society.
In the legislative area:
Association law is undergoing transformation in several countries.
- In Lebanon, the law of associations has survived two attempts at imposing severe restrictions, including a legislative change that sought to replace the unfettered establishment of associations by a regime of prior authorisation.
- Morocco and Palestine have adopted new laws on associations that can be seen as much more liberal than the previous legislation.
- In Jordan, on the other hand, a more restrictive law is under study; preliminary discussions have taken place and numerous criticisms have been made about this proposed law.
In the judicial area:
The judiciary has played a vital role in defining association law and freedom of association, as well as protecting this freedom in the face of administrative and even legislative encroachments. The effectiveness of that role, however, depends on the degree of independence of the judiciary. The situation in that regard is not always ideal in the countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean, and varies considerably from one country to another6[6].
In Lebanon, for example, the State Council and, at one point, the Court of Cassation, played a very important role in rectifying the faults of administrative practices and clarifying the nature of the receipt for legal documents (the Ilm wa Khabar) for purposes of defining and protecting freedom of association.
In Egypt, the very important judgment made by the Supreme Constitutional Court on the subject of association law (referred to above), after many years of hesitation by the Supreme Court, must be highlighted. As well, one must point out the courage displayed in recent years by the State Council, which recently issued an important judgment on the establishment of a human rights association.
In the area of civil society:
There has been a growing mobilisation of civil society in various countries in favour of the protection and improvement of association law, and one must note in particular the efforts made by civil society in Lebanon, Morocco and Egypt as well as by the Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network.
Also worthy of mention are several doctrinal efforts to define the scope and content of association law in accordance with the principle of freedom of association. In particular, one must note the work of 18 Arab jurists from nine countries who, after two years of study, at the initiative of ADDL (Association pour la défense des droits et des libertés) and the Friedrich Naumann Foundation’s Bunian programme, developed the Declaration of Principles and Criteria relating to the Freedom of Association in Arab Countries on 10 July 19997[7].
For the purposes of this overview, and while awaiting the development of more accurate indicators to measure the extent of respect for or violation of freedom of association, we propose to measure the degree of respect for the principles of freedom of association by highlighting its main elements, illustrated with examples from the different country chapters, in order to determine the best regulations and practices in the matter (which we will call ‘freedom regimes’) and the worst (which we will call ‘repression regimes’), as well as those which can be placed halfway between freedom and repression (which we will call ‘control regimes’).
Accordingly, we have structured this preliminary assessment, as in all of the country reports, into five broad streams corresponding to the intervention of law in the life of associations: Formation and incorporation; Dissolution and suspension; Organisation and operation; Funding ands taxation; and Control, governance et transparency of the associations.
The freedom to establish an association without having to obtain a permit or prior administrative authorisation is the principal foundation of freedom of association. In this context, associations are created through the common volition of the founding members. The declaration of the association’s existence may be provided by means of a simple statement, but the establishment of the association is not subject to any form of prior intervention by administrative or judicial authorities. In case the existence of this freedom is not established, there is a real risk that the creation of associations will take place on a selective and discretionary basis and become a preserve of ‘friends’ of the regime as well as a source of political and administrative corruption.
1. Freedom to register the association or not (juristic personality)
a) Freedom regimes (such as embodied in the legislation of several European countries) recognise the right of associations to be created without necessarily having to inform the administrative authorities through a registration system. Naturally, such undeclared associations do not enjoy a juristic personality that is distinct from their members.
b) Repression and control regimes (such as those in place in all countries of the southern and eastern Mediterranean, without exception) force all associations to declare themselves to the authorities or to obtain a prior authorisation. Undeclared associations are prohibited. They are referred to as ‘secret associations’ by several regimes and may be subject to severe penalties.
2. Freedom to declare and register through a simple information mechanism
a) In freedom regimes (in European states, Lebanon, Morocco and Turkey, for example), the establishment of associations is not contingent upon obtaining a prior administrative authorisation but merely requires that the association inform the competent authority through a written statement containing a number of elements of information defined in the law. The association becomes a legal entity, with all of the effects attached to that status, upon the submission of the written statement. The written statement is not an application, but only a request that the administration record the establishment of the association. This passive role of the authorities is one of the very foundations of freedom of association. The administration may prevent the issuance of a recent only on limited grounds spelled out in the legislation. These grounds may be more or less numerous and more or less abusive, depending on the country.
b) In control regimes (in Lebanese administrative practice, for example), there is a marked difference between the principle established in law and administrative practice, which often transforms, de facto, the regime based on a simple statement into a prior authorisation regime.
c) In repression regimes (in Egypt, Syria and Libya, for example), the creation of associations is subject to obtaining prior authorisation, a matter that is left to the discretion of the authorities. In some cases, applications for the creation of an association are not even acknowledged or recorded. The silence of the authorities is then tantamount to a rejection.
3. Cases in which registration may be denied
a) In freedom regimes (European states, Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey), the cases in which the registration of an association may be denied are limited; they are in keeping with conditions of legitimate restriction and in compliance with international standards.
b) In repression and control regimes, the cases in which the registration of an association may be denied are more or less numerous and confer to the competent authority a more or less discretionary power to deny registration (e.g. Tunisia, Egypt, Syria, Libya, etc.).
4. Administrative registration procedure
a) In freedom regimes, administrative registration procedures are simple and not burdensome.
b) In repression and control regimes, the administrative conditions that must be met for registration are complicated, lengthy and burdensome. Several controls are conducted on the background of the founding members as well as on the desirability of or need for the purpose that the association intends to pursue. These controls are often carried out by administrative bodies but also by police agencies (e.g. Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Libya, etc.).
5. Administrative and judicial remedies in cases of denial of registration or registration delays
a) In freedom regimes, administrative and judicial remedies are efficient.
b) In repression and control regimes, there are cases where the denial of registration or registration delays by the authorities are not subjected to any remedy, and others where a certain balance is sought in the sense that the law contains provisions designed to limit the scope of the administration’s discretion or mitigate its dysfunction. For example, some laws stipulate that the reason for rejection must be explained, set a deadline for responding or recognise that a lack of response is equivalent to an approval. A right to appeal to the courts is also available. However, in countries where the independence of the judiciary in its relations with the executive is far from guaranteed, it is not always assured that associations will gain by appealing.
6. Institutional alternatives to the association
a) In freedom regimes (where registration is done through a simple statement), there is no need to seek another type of institutional entity than the association.
b) In repression and control regimes, when the application to form an association is denied, it often becomes necessary to seek viable institutional and procedural alternatives in order to circumvent the abuses of the legal system in place or abusive administrative practices. These alternatives are more or less feasible and more or less tolerated, depending on the efficiency or the degree of repression of the competent authorities.
· When the legislation is in violation of the principle of freedom of association, some groups decide to establish a company instead of an association, despite the fiscal problems that this may entail (Egypt, Jordan and Lebanon). This practice is well known to the authorities and often tolerated by them, as demonstrated by the situation in Egypt, where the association law (which was repealed by the Supreme Constitutional Court) specifically prohibited this type of association disguised as a company.
· When administrative practice is in violation of the law (as in Lebanon), the association’s founding members can forward the statement of information to the competent authority through a bailiff, whose minutes confirm the receipt of the documents required by law, thus avoiding the risk that the association could be characterised as secret.
The threat of dissolution is as important for an association as is the establishment phase. When dissolution is decided upon by the administration or even by the judicial system – when the independence of the judiciary is far from guaranteed – it becomes a sword of Damocles that is used both to keep associations that are being watched by the authorities on a tight leash and to strike when the need arises.
a) In freedom regimes (European states, Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey, Israel), the established principle is that the public authorities do not have the right to dissolve associations. Dissolution must follow a decision by the association’s own competent body or a final judgment by a court after the association has been able to defend its case in a public and fair trial, in limited situations that are explicitly defined in the legislation.
b) In control and repression regimes, the competent authority enjoys exorbitant discretionary powers. The causes under which dissolution may be decided are very vague and can often be no more than a benign violation of the law or of the association’s own statute. Cases of criminal proceedings against association’s members and directors are numerous and often disproportionate in relation to the infractions.
For example, Egyptian law provides that the directors and founding members of an association are liable to six months’ imprisonment and a fine for the following infractions: the launch of any activity before prior authorisation has been obtained; the attendance of any third party at the association’s meetings; fund-raising before a prior administrative authorisation has been obtained. In case of violation of any kind of the law or of the association’s statute, the Ministry of Social Affairs can take one of the following measures:
- Appoint a director or an entire board of directors for a period determined by the minister;
- Prohibit the alleged persons responsible for the infraction from being candidates in the elections;
- Close the association’s office for a period determined by the minister until he decides what step should be taken in the case: appoint new directors, merge the association with another, or dissolve the association. When dissolution has occurred, the competent authority seizes the association’s property and distributes it among social organisations of its choice.
In theory, the association has a right to appeal to the tribunal. Very often, that right is only available in theory because the documents that the association might need to defend itself against the alleged violations are out of reach because they are sequestered or already in the hands of the competent ministry.
An association is first and foremost a contract. As such, its mode of operation can and must therefore be decided upon freely by its own members. Any abusive or illegal interference by the authorities in this private entity does not foster the development of an independent civil society but instead runs the risk of creating a series of organisations that are more or less linked to the state, a kind of decentralisation or devolution of social services and sometimes of political services. Clearly, not all associations operate in accordance with the rules and conditions required by internal democracy, transparency and integrity. However, direct intervention by the state, which is not always motivated by an interest in the democratic management of the association itself, cannot be justified in law. Several other types of corrective measure can be adopted while respecting the principle of freedom of association.
1. Freedom to draft and modify the statutes (including the purpose) and bylaws
a) In freedom regimes, the association’s purpose and statutes, the identity, opinions or number of its founding members, the areas of activity or category of the association may not be obstacles to its establishment. The members of the association enjoy broad latitude in freely drafting and modifying its statutes and internal bylaws and defining its purpose. Model statutes are provided only for guidance.
b) In control and repression regimes, associations are not free to establish their own statutes and bylaws but must adopt those which have been established by the competent authority. Any deviation from this model or any change to it must first be approved.
Similarly, certain legislations (in Tunisia, for example) and certain practices (as in Lebanon) tend to restrict the activities of each association to a single area. Any activity falling outside the ‘authorised’ area is seen as an infringement of the law. This practice is a violation of the principle of freedom of association and, in Lebanon, a violation of its own laws. In Egypt, an association must choose a single area of activity among 12 areas predefined by the legislation. Any activity of a political nature is banned. The association wishing to develop its activities in several areas must obtain a special permission from the Ministry of Social Affairs. Similarly, the geographical scope of activity is limited to the governorate where the association is registered. A special administrative authorisation is required to broaden the geographical scope of activity.
2. Freedom to join or leave the association
a) In freedom regimes, there is no legal limit preventing an individual from joining or leaving an association, unless its statutes provide specific stipulations regarding membership.
b) In control and repression regimes, the competent authority can decide who can join an association by putting in place a procedure for prior identity control by the security services (as in Syria).
3. Non-interference in the management and activities of associations
a) In freedom regimes (European states, Lebanon, Morocco, Turkey), the association is managed by the bodies provided for in its own statutes and bylaws. The public authorities may not interfere with its meetings, elections or activities, nor exert any influence thereon.
b) In control and repression regimes, competent authorities interfere in the strangest and most illegitimate ways, encouraged in this by specific repressive laws (rules concerning public or private meetings, the written and audiovisual media and the internet, for example):
· Interference in meetings: Public or private meetings may not be held without prior authorisation. The presence of a representative from the competent authority may be required for the event to be considered valid (e.g. Libya, Syria, Egypt, Algeria). In Syria, the organisers of meetings must first obtain prior authorisation, which may be denied by the competent ministry if it deems that the meeting does not meet the goals of the association.
· Interference in the activities of the association (for example, by demanding that a particular document be forwarded to the competent authority): examples of this are found in Libya, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia and, to a lesser extent, Jordan. In Israel, the Registrar has the authority to control the activities of associations, which can seriously threaten their independence.
· Interference in the travels of association members: in Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Algeria, an association member wishing to travel abroad to take part in an associational event must obtain a special authorisation.
· Interference in the right of associations to join and work with regional and international networks: this type of restriction is found in Libya, Syria and Algeria.
· Interference in the association’s publications (including websites): the highest numbers of violations of freedom of expression are found Libya, Syria, Egypt and Tunisia.
4. Participation in public-interest consultations and decisions
a) In freedom regimes, the involvement of specialised associations in the development of public policy is encouraged, in particular in specific areas (in Lebanon, for example, local human rights organisations were consulted as part of the formulation the national human rights plan).
b) In control and repression regimes, associations are never asked to take part in such consultations.
5. Participation of women in association bodies
No national report has cited specific legal discrimination against the presence of women on association bodies. However, discrimination against women is common, with customs, traditions and respect for public morality being among the reasons invoked for such practices.
The legal capacity and taxation regime that are applied to associations are very effective tools, both to strengthen their effectiveness or, on the contrary, keep them in a position of dependency and weakness. The risk for the associations is that the law may give them only a very small margin to finance their activities from their own resources or from international sources, and that they may find themselves in a situation where their activities and their effectiveness are limited to a small group of volunteers with very limited resources.
a) In freedom regimes, associations have the right to secure their own financial resources through such means as philanthropic donations, membership fees, donations from members, gifts and assistance provided by any local or foreign entity or individual. Associations also have the right to organise activities intended to generate profits that can be used to finance their activities, provided that these proceeds are not redistributed to the members.
From the point of view of legal capacity, most association laws in the Euro-Mediterranean region acknowledge the distinction between associations that are registered through a simply statement and those which serve a public purpose. The former enjoy only partial legal capacity while the latter have more substantial legal capacity, although it remains limited relative to that enjoyed by individuals and corporations.
Associations recognised as serving the public interest have a favourable taxation regime and a preferential access to public funds. In Lebanon, however, although associations registered under ordinary law may not own real estate or receive bequests, their legal capacity does not seem to pose any problems. There are no restrictions on the ability of Lebanese associations to obtain funding from abroad.
b) In control and repression regimes, the finances of associations, regardless of their area of activity, are under the control of the competent authority.
The status of public-interest association is subject to conditions that give the competent authority a broad margin for discretionary power. The same is true with respect to the access of associations to public funds.
Any financial contribution from abroad must receive prior approval, and violations of this rule may attract severe penalties. Prior authorisation by the authorities is also required for private fund-raising activities, regardless of the form they may take (fund-raising from individuals or through the organisation of a charity event, a performance, a sports event, etc.). In Tunisia and Algeria, associations must reveal the source and use of donations. In Libya and Syria, funding from outside sources is banned entirely.
Freedom of association does not imply the absence of good governance or of any controls. Indeed, good internal governance, strengthened by accounting transparency and effective internal and external monitoring, help to strengthen the public credibility of associations as well as their legitimacy in the eyes of their members and of society in general.
1. Supervisory authorities and freedom
a) In freedom regimes, associations are subject to internal and external controls performed by a wide variety of entities. For example, they must be accountable to all interested individuals, within the limits of that interest, which warrants monitoring by the following entities:
i) members of the association with respect to all of its affairs;
ii) public opinion and society where there is a legitimate general interest in the association’s activities (for example, the requirement for financial transparency when the association seeks funding through public donations);
iii) ordinary tribunals;
iv) public authorities (taxation controls only), within the limits of the special tax privileges and regimes enjoyed by the association.
b) In control and repression regimes, the role of the public authorities is excessive and disproportionate.
2. Sanctions
a) In freedom regimes, the principle of proportionality between the penalty and the infraction must be applied. The ordinary activities of the association and its members must not be subject to criminal sanctions. In all cases, such penalties may only be determined or applied by the judicial authorities after the right to defend oneself has been guaranteed through a fair, public trial.
b) In control and repression regimes, the main feature of the sanction regime is the extreme criminalisation of the smallest violations, with penalties that can go as far as prison sentences (Libya, Algeria, Syria, Tunisia and Egypt), and even a death sentence (Syria and Libya).
This overview clearly reveals the scope of the threats and of the actual consequences that are attached to flawed association laws in countries of the eastern and southern Mediterranean, in violation of the principle of freedom of association. Any attempt to bring these countries to provide a broader democratic regime and to ensure respect for the rule of law and sustainable development, as well as the development of an independent and effective civil society, must be based on improved association laws and freedom of association. The task is urgent – critically so in several countries.
In this context, the first step is to increase awareness-raising efforts aimed at society in general, but also – and especially – at the legal profession, about freedom of association, as well as about its scope and about the principles and standards that must govern association law, as ignorance and indifference as the worst enemies.
Additionally, practical recommendations will have to be developed for each country, and these should serve to define targeted interventions, adapted to the context and needs of each. Some countries remain far from the goal, while others have a greater potential for efforts at improvement to produce some results, small though they may be.
The action we advocate is not an intellectual exercise or a purely legal discussion but it demonstrates the importance of the law as a tool of democratic and social development, rather than as an instrument of repression used by the political authorities.
[1] Deputy in the Lebanese Parliament, rapporteur of the parliamentary commission on human rights, lawyer, lecturer at the Law Faculty of Université Saint-Joseph, coordinator of the Arab Initiative for Freedom of Association. Back to text
[2]As used in this report, the word ‘association’ pertains to the institution known as such in the tradition of French civil law, which has has a profound influence on most legal systems in Mediterranean countries. It refers to any ‘body comprised of a number of individuals who, on an ongoing basis, share their knowledge or their activities for a purpose other than sharing profits’, whatever purpose or goals the association is pursuing, the purpose serves to characterise the specific type of association. The country reports published in this report do not cover political parties or trade unions.Back to text
[3] This led the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights to refer to freedom of association as the ‘neglected freedom’. Back to text
[4]Some of the more liberal documents (in Lebanon, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, for example) refer explicitly to the generic term freedom of association, which includes all individual and collective rights. However, the Arabic rendition of all of these articles erroneously translated ‘freedom of association’ as ‘freedom to establish associations’, which is a more reductive interpretation – in Arabic, حرية [تأسيس] [تأليف] [تكوين] الجمعيات. Other constitutions (Egypt, Jordan and Palestine, for example) refer directly to the more reductive expression ‘freedom to form associations’. The Syrian constitution does not mention freedom of association but refers to freedom of peaceful assembly and expression. At the same time – and rather surprisingly – it devotes several articles to specific associations, such as the Baath Party (art. 8), citizens’ organisations and cooperative associations (art. 9), ‘trade union, social and professional’ organisations (art. 48) and ‘citizens’ organisations’ (art. 49). Some constitutions subordinate the exercise of the right of association to the respect of certain more or less precise political principles that are entrenched as constitutional values, such as ‘the social system’ in Egypt or ‘the edification of socialist Arab society and the protection of its organisation’ in Syria. Back to text
[5]Amman Declaration on freedom of association , 1999. See also Freedom of Association in the Euro-Mediterranean Region. Casablanca Declaration, October 2001, a publication of the EMHRN, AMDF, OMDH and Espace associatif. Back to text
[6]See the EMHRN report, Justice in the South and East of the Mediterranean Region, 2005. Back to text
[7]Also referred to as the Arab Declaration or Amman Declaration. Back to text
